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Towards Sustainable Security in Systems-of-Systems

April 25 April 26

You are all invited to join the ASSURED Scientific Workshop on Sustainable Security and future proofing of ICT Trust Chains, to be held on April 25th-26th, 2023 hosted by the Computer Science department of TU Darmstadt at the Welcome Hotel Darmstadt in Germany.

The overarching vision of future-proofing the next-generation of Smart Connectivity “Systems-of-Systems”, comprising a multitude of heterogeneous embedded systems, is of paramount importance for cementing Europe’s vision towards secure and sustainable service graph chains. In this context, considering the diversity of involved stakeholders with varying security and privacy requirements, the endmost goal is to enable the long-term transformation of such distributed environments with security solutions that can cover all the layers of the deployed application stack; from network security to application security and data security, each element plays an important role into the system’s overall security posture.

As such, security should be implemented in a sustainable way, namely achieving limiting energy and computational resources consumption, and being at least capable of supporting crypto-agility (so as to allow updates of security primitives rather than replacement of whole devices). These two properties are challenging to offer in security, since several attacks and weaknesses are discovered every day and simple updates could not be sufficient to defeat them. In recent years, we are observing the discovery of a growing number of hardware design and implementation vulnerabilities that could be exploited by unprivileged software, leading to potential exposure of sensitive data or compromise of whole computing systems. This new attack paradigm casts a long shadow on decades of research on system security and disrupts the traditional threat models, thus, highlighting the pressing need for a new breed of flexible runtime assurance mechanisms based on system adaptation and enabling dynamic system re-configuration.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that, in this moment, families of cryptographic algorithms are being replaced by novel standards (such as the post quantum one). Security can even be of great help to support sustainability, for instance by allowing secure update of devices and enabling maintenance that would extend the devices live. Yet, support for these features should be studied in depth and fully understood to avoid the involuntary insertion of security weaknesses. Unfortunately, existing solutions are often ad-hoc, limited, inefficient, and address only specific problems.

In this context, the ASSURED project aims to develop a novel (formally verified) runtime assurance framework capable of establishing and managing trust between entities, starting from bi-lateral interactions between two single system components and continuing as such systems get connected to even larger system entities. This is achieved through novel, highly efficient attestation schemes aiming at converting edge devices into trust anchors capable of proving verifiable evidence for their configuration and operational state against cross-layer vulnerabilities and even zero-day exploits. Beyond the needs of sustainable security and functional safety, ASSURED also considers methodologies for agile certification towards verifying those system attributes that are best suited for depicting the required level of trust.

This two-day interactive workshop aims at bringing together industry, academia and standardization bodies for addressing the relation between sustainability and security from both sides; discussing what can be done to make security more sustainable and presenting new research security directions in making electronic devices more sustainable. Interesting discussions will be held on exploring new ideas for tackling the challenges related but not limited to security-by-design for embedded systems, scalable assurance and verification methodologies for system security and resilience (both software and hardware), and security-aware policy enforcement and deployment that pave the way for establishing sustainable security for computing platforms.


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Day 1 Workshop Program | 9:00 – 18:15 CEST
From – ToTopicSpeaker
9:00 – 9:15Introduction to ASSUREDThanassis Giannetsos, Dimitris Papamartzivanos (UBITECH)
WPs Technical RoadMap
9:15-10:15“CASU: Compromise Avoidance via Secure Update for Low-End Embedded Systems”

Guaranteeing runtime integrity of embedded system software is an open problem. Trade-offs between security and other priorities (e.g., cost or performance) are inherent, and resolving them is both challenging and important. The proliferation of runtime attacks that introduce malicious code (e.g., by injection) into embedded devices has prompted a range of mitigation techniques. One popular approach is Remote Attestation (RA), whereby a trusted entity (verifier) checks the current software state of an untrusted remote device (prover). RA yields a timely authenticated snapshot of prover’s state that verifier uses to decide whether an attack/compromise has occurred. Current schemes require verifier to explicitly initiate RA, based on some unclear criteria. Thus, in case of prover’s compromise, verifier only learns about it late, upon the next RA instance. While sufficient for compromise detection, some applications would benefit from a more proactive, prevention-based approach. To this end, we construct CASU: Compromise Avoidance via Secure Updates. CASU is an inexpensive hardware/software co-design enforcing: (i) runtime software immutability, thus precluding any illegal software modification, and (ii) authenticated updates as the sole means of modifying software. In CASU, a successful RA instance serves as a proof of successful update, and continuous subsequent software integrity is implicit, due to the runtime immutability guarantee. This obviates the need for RA in between software updates and leads to unobtrusive integrity assurance with guarantees akin to those of prior RA techniques, with better overall performance.
Gene Tsudik (University of California)
10:15 – 11:00“Trusted Environment for Future Consumer Devices”Jan-Erik Ekberg (Huawei)
11:00 – 11:15Coffee Break
11:15 – 12:00“System Tracing: From Cloud to IoT”

Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is an essential technique for monitoring the runtime state of a virtual machine. VMI systems enable a wide range of applications, such as malware detection. Existing VMI systems rely on privileged software, e.g., a hypervisor, to ensure a trustworthy operation. Thus, they compete with the introspected VMs for shared CPU resources and impact their performance. Moreover, malware may detect these systems via side-channel leakage and hide their presence or compromise the systems by exploiting vulnerabilities.

During my presentation, I will showcase various methods for monitoring systems in cloud and IoT environments. Additionally, I will exhibit how specialized hardware can be used to address the limitations of traditional VMI systems in these contexts.
Ahmad Atamli (NVIDIA)
12:00 – 12:45“Efficient and Scalable Fuzzing of Complex Software Stacks”

In this talk, I will give an overview of our recent progress in randomized testing (“fuzzing”) and present some of the methods we have developed in the last few years. These include fuzzing of operating system kernels / hypervisors and fuzz testing of embedded systems. The talk will focus on our recent work on Fuzztruction, a novel perspective on generating inputs in highly complex formats without relying on heavyweight program analysis techniques, coarse-grained grammar approximation, or a human domain expert. I will conclude the talk with an outlook on challenges yet to be solved.
Thorsten Holz (CISPA Center for Information Security)
12:45 – 14:00Lunch Break
14:00 – 14:45“Financial Crime Detection with Privacy”

Privacy-enhancing technologies, particularly MPC, have been questioned about their practicality. Last summer, a competition was organized by the USA and UK governments (U.S.-U.K. PETs Prize Challenges), where privacy researchers were tasked to solve the fraud detection problem using machine learning algorithms while providing privacy guarantees to banks and their users. For this purpose, we developed the cryptographic part of the solution, where the result is a custom protocol that allows payment providers to check whether a user’s credentials match the credentials in a bank’s database without the bank learning any information about the user. At the same time, the payment provider never has access to the bank’s database. These seemingly-impossible constructions are made possible using a particular type of encryption called homomorphic encryption. The competition results show that privacy-enhancing technologies are fast enough to be practically deployable. They provide solutions for problems that are otherwise hard to address without exposing private data.

We are glad to announce that our team from the Delft University of Technology and researchers from the University of Washington Tacoma won second place as the “PPML Huskies” team. In this talk, we will investigate the proposed approach that wins a prize and the competition itself.
Zeki Erkin (Cyber Security Group, Delft University of Technology)
14:45 – 15:30“Post-Quantum Direct Anonymous Attestation (PQ-DAA)”

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a group type of anonymous signature scheme, which allows users in a group to sign messages such that the signatures can be verified using a group public key, and the actual signers’ identities are not revealed (beyond the fact that they belong to the group). DAA was originally designed to support anonymous attestation using a Trusted Platform Module TPM, which is a small component embedded in a host computer platform. A unique feature of DAA is that a group signer’s role is split into two entities, a principal signer and an assistant signer; the former is the TPM, and the latter is the host platform.

Currently standardized DAA schemes have their security supported on the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. Should a quantum-computer become available in the next few decades, these schemes will be broken. There is therefore a need to start developing post-quantum DAA schemes. Our research into quantum-resistant DAA has resulted in several Lattice-based schemes, the security of our schemes is proved in the Universally Composable (UC) security model under the hardness assumptions of the Ring Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution (Ring-ISIS) and Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) problems. Our current work is designing the first post-quantum DAA scheme from symmetric primitives with a full security analysis of the proposed scheme in the UC model.
Nada El Kassem (University of Surrey)
15:30 – 15:45Coffee Break
15:45 – 16:30Panel Discussion
“Towards Sustainable Security – Converging Software and Adaptable Hardware Security”
16:30 – 17:15“A software-based approach to secure bare-metal devices”

Recently, several hardware-assisted security architectures have been proposed to mitigate the ever-growing cyberattacks on Internet-connected devices. However, such proposals are not compatible with a large portion of the already deployed resource-constrained embedded devices due to hardware limitations. The vast majority of such devices are bare-metal, where they execute programs in fully-accessible and unprotected memories without any operating system and even without any form of security. To fill this gap we propose a pure software-based trusted computing architecture that provides embedded devices that lack hardware-based memory protection units with memory isolation using software virtualisation and assembly-level code verification. Its design has been formally proven to preserve memory isolation as well as the implementation to be memory-safe and crash-free. The solution fully supports critical features such as Direct Memory Access (DMA) and interrupts. We then show how memory isolation enables many security services, such as remote attestation and secure code updates that could be fully implemented in software and provide similar security guarantees of implementations that rely on hardware features.
Bruno Crispo (Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, University of Trento)
17:15 – 17:45“PrivateAI – Protecting security and privacy for the life-cycle of machine learning”Matthias Schunter (INTEL)
17:45 – 18:25“Are the Trust Frameworks ready? Towards achieving Digital Sovereignty in Decentralized Ecosystems and its role in Credentials Exchange”

Decentralized ecosystems involve coordination across multiple parties, all exercising their sovereignty while respecting their obligations upon which others may rely. However, there is a lack of open standards specifications and vendor-neutral technology components from which transacting parties can choose what is needed to meet the requirements of their trust community. The above concerns also impact interoperability and transitive trust while maximizing the risk of vendor lock-in. This talk gives a brief overview of Trust Frameworks for decentralized ecosystems and the need for policies and rules to enable governance to ensure automation and extensibility amongst the stakeholders to achieve Digital Sovereignty. In addition, the talk covers the need for credential exchange to bridge trust across ecosystem transactions and data flows and the role of Trust Framework in enabling it.
Bithin Alangot (Huawei)
18:25 – 18:30Closing RemarksJean-Baptiste Milon (MARTEL)
Day 2 Workshop Program | 9:00 – 15:30 CEST
From – ToTopicSpeaker
9:00 – 9:45“Securing location and reducing device exposure”

A broad gamut of Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile applications are location-based or, in fact, their operation relies on real-time, precise position information. This brings forth a dual challenge: how to secure position information and how to limit device traceability. In this talk we discuss recent results on each front. First, methods to secure Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-based position (and time) services and, second, methods to reduce device position exposure in location-based systems.
Panagiotis Papadimitratos (Networked Systems Security Group, KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
9:45 – 10:30“Asynchronous Remote Key Generation and its Applications”Mark Manulis (Department of Computer Science, Universität der Bundeswehr München)
10:30 – 10:45Coffee Break
10:45 – 11:15“GNNs-Based Zero-Assumption Control-Flow Attestation”

Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) methods enable a verifier to verify the integrity of code execution on a remote prover’s system. However, existing CFA schemes have limitations, such as relying on unrealistic assumptions or needing a considerable amount of memory measurements. Additionally, they are not suitable for attesting resource-constrained systems because of their high computational overhead and resource usage.
To address these limitations we designed a lightweight and privacy-enhancing CFA method capable of detecting Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs), including control- and non-control-data attacks (i.e., DOP attacks). It extracts features from one execution trace without assuming completeness and uses Unsupervised Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to identify malicious execution paths.
Marco Chilese (Technical University of Darmstadt)
11:15 – 11:45“Are we there Yet? Decentralized Trust Anchors as the Future of Digital Identity Verification”Benjamin Larsen (Technical University of Denmark)
11:45 – 12:15“Enhanced DAA flavors and Trust Revocation in Distributed Environments”Dimitris Papamartzivanos, Stefanos Vasileiadis (UBITECH)
12:15 – 12:45“Searchable Symmetric Encryption and its attacks”

Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that enables users to delegate keyword searches over encrypted databases to a server that may be trustworthy but inquisitive, while maintaining the confidentiality of the keywords and the encrypted documents. In this presentation, we will provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, mechanisms, and security principles associated with SSE. Additionally, we will examine existing threats to SSE and outline some of the outstanding challenges in this field.
Kaitai Liang (Technical University of Delft)
12:45 – 14:00Lunch Break
14:00 – 14:45“Beyond Physical: Revisiting the Interplay of Side-channel analysis and AI”

Side-channel analysis has changed the field of cryptography and security and it became the most common cause of real-world security applications failing today. In this talk we give an overview of side-channel attacks on implementations of cryptography and countermeasures. We discuss the ways in which Machine learning and AI changed the side-channel analysis landscape and attackers’ capabilities in particular. We survey several examples of AI assisting with leakage evaluation and discuss the impact of it on the field and security evaluations in particular. We also describe the way side-channel analysis threatens AI implementations e.g. neural nets architectures that are commonly used in practice. In the end, we identify some avenues for future research.
Lejla Batina (Digital Security Group, Radboud University)
14:45 – 15:00“Edge Computing and Systems-of-Systems: Security through Zero Trust – Overview”

The concept of trust is used in many different ways in Cybersecurity, from something you can trust because it has been proven to comply with certain security guarantees, to something you have to trust for everything to work (this is similar to what in psychology is known as the Stockholm syndrome). “Zero Trust principles and architectures are a response to significant problems in the traditional perimeter-based security model, which primarily tries to prevent attacks against the system from the outside. Zero Trust does away with the assumption that all systems, processes and components inside a well defined boundary can be trusted. There are several definition of Zero Trust Architectures, but most identify a few core principles, e.g. Microsoft identifies three core principles: Explicit verification of all actors in the system, Adhere to the principle of least privilege and Assume breach.

To understand the meaning of Zero Trust, we look at the role trust plays in existing security policies and technologies. We give a brief overview of the main elements of a Zero Trust Architecture and discuss the underlying trust assumptions and challenges that face Zero Trust Architectures.
Christian D. Jensen (Technical
University of Denmark)
Session – The use of Trusted Computing towards Enhanced Security and Privacy
15:00 – 15:15“Security challenges and trusted computing in the Smart Satellites domain”

Smart satellites are increasingly relied upon for critical functions such as communication, navigation, and earth observation. However, the security of these systems is under constant threat from cyberattacks, and a single successful attack could have devastating consequences. Trusted computing provides advanced security measures that can enhance the security and reliability of safety-critical systems in space. By establishing a secure foundation for a satellite’s software and hardware components, trusted computing can protect against attacks that attempt to compromise the integrity or confidentiality of sensitive data.
Emmanouil Bakiris (SPACE HELLAS)
15:15 – 15:30ASSURED Workshop Closing RemarksDimitris Papamartzivanos, Jean-Baptise Milon, Thanassis Giannetsos

Meet the speakers

Bithin Alangot

Dr. Bithin Alangot is a senior researcher at Trustworthiness Theory, Technology and Engineering Lab (TTTE), Huawei Munich Research Center (MRC), Germany.

Before moving to Huawei MRC in November 2021, he worked as a Research Fellow at the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD), leading a collaboration project on the privacy-preserving detection of credentials misuse in Decentralized Identity systems. During his Ph.D., he worked with Prof. Pawel Szalachowski at SUTD on Blockchain security research. He designed an Eclipse Attack detection protocol for the Bitcoin Blockchain network and was part of a blockchain-based secure logging project.

His research interest includes Access Control, Usage Control, Decentralized Identity Systems and Governance, Applied Cryptography, and Blockchain security.

Ahmad Atamli

Dr. Ahmad Atamli is the Innovator and Director leading Nvidia’s involvement in the ASSURED project on runtime tracing. The team led by Dr. Atamli aims to provide efficient monitoring of the behavior of a system, ranging from IoT devices to devices used in cloud environments.

In his early career at Mellanox Technologies, Dr. Atamli led the security architecture of BlueField Data Processing Unit (DPU), a new innovative technology that provides an isolated environment and hardware primitive for securing cloud environments. The aforementioned innovation shows significant improvement in multiple security workloads, delivering better scale and efficiency compared to host machines.

Dr. Atamli has 15+ years of experience in cybersecurity and has led the development of many security products in the IoT and Cloud space. He holds a Ph.D. in System Security from the University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Dr. Atamli has published  numerous world-class academic articles in ACM, IEEE, Springer, and others and holds several patents in the security field. He has wide experience in various security domains such as hardware, platform, and system security, digital forensics, malware analysis, memory analysis, and trust in cloud environments.

Emmanouil Bakiris

Emmanouil Bakiris is an R&D Software Engineer at Space Hellas SA in Apps and R&D Department. He is also a postgraduate student in Cybersecurity and Data Science at the Department of Informatics of University of Piraeus. He holds an Integrated Master from the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering by the University of Thessaly.

His research interests include Hardware Security, Cybersecurity, Machine learning and Optimization Algorithms.

Lejla Batina

Lejla Batina is a professor in embedded systems security at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. She received her Ph.D. from KU Leuven, Belgium (2005) and before that she worked as a cryptographer for SafeNet B.V. in The Netherlands (2001–2003).

She has coauthored more than 150 refereed articles on various topics in applied cryptography and embedded system security. Her current research interests include physical attacks on cryptographic implementations and the impact of AI on hardware security. 

She is a senior member of IEEE and an Editorial board member of top journals in security, such as IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security and ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems. She was program co-chair of CHES 2014, ACM WiSec 2021, Africacrypt 2022, SPACE 2020-2022 and she co-organized (as general chair) IACR flagship conferences like EUROCRYPT and Real-world crypto symposium (RWC). Her research group at Radboud consists of 10+ researchers and 11 Ph.D. students have so far graduated under her supervision.

Marco Chilese

Marco Chilese is a Ph.D. student and Research Assistant at the System Security Lab of Prof. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technical University of Darmstadt (Germany) since 2021. He received his Master’s Degree in Computer Science from the University of Padua (Italy) under the supervision of Prof. Mauro Conti with a focus on Artificial Intelligence. He was also an Erasmus Student at Technical University of Denmark during 2020.

His research focuses on Deep Learning and Security. In particular, he concentrates on innovative security-enhancing applications of Machine Learning.

Bruno Crispo

Prof. Bruno Crispo is a full professor at the Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Trento. Prior to that, he was a professor at KULeuven in Belgium and at Vrije Universities Amsterdam in the Netherlands. He worked also for the Stander Research Institute in Uk and at the Research Lab of Telecom Italia. He holds an MSc in Computer Science from the University of Torino, Italy, and a Ph.D. in Computer Security from Cambridge University, UK. His research interests include system and network security, embedded systems security, behavioural biometrics, access control and web security. He has been Associate Editor of the ACM Transactions on Information and Systems Security (TISSEC, now TOPS) from 2013 – 2021. He is a senior member of IEEE.

Currently, he is the scientific coordinator of the CROSSCON project, a RIA Horizon Europe international project addressing the problem of increasing the assurance of trusted architectures and trusted applications as well as the interoperability of trusted services across the wide and heterogeneous spectrum of connected devices.

Nada El Kassem

Nada El Kassem is currently a Research Fellow in Applied Cryptography & Trusted Computing at the Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey. She received her Ph.D. from University of Surrey (2020). Her current research is designing post quantum Lattice and Hash-based DAA schemes suitable for hardware implementations and IoT applications in the post-Quantum age.

She also works with the ASSURED European project for providing resilient cybersecurity, privacy, and data protection management through newly designed cryptographic protocols supporting Direct Anonymous Attestation, Swarm Attestation (SA), Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) and Verifiable Credentials (VC) that offer a high-level security and privacy assurances using hardware-based keys.

Zeki Erkin

Dr Zeki Erkin is an associate professor in the Cyber Security Group, Delft University of Technology. He received his PhD degree on “Secure Signal Processing” in 2010 from Delft University of Technology where he has continued his research on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, particularly on Computational Privacy. His interest is in protecting sensitive data from malicious entities and service providers using cryptographic tools. While his interest in solutions based on provably secure cryptographic protocols is the core of his research, Dr Erkin is also investigating distributed trust for building such protocols without trusted entities, e.g. for federated machine learning.

Dr. Erkin has been involved in several European and national projects.  He is also serving in numerous committees including IEEE Information Forensics and Security Technical Commitee as chair and Editor in Chief for Eurasip Journal on Information Security. Dr Erkin is a member of TU Delft Blockchain Lab, also serving as a core member of Cyber Security Next Generation (CSng), a community of cyber security researchers in the Netherlands, ICT Next Generation (ICTng), PEN.NL (Privacy Engineering Network) and vice-chair of ACCSS, a foundation of cyber security researchers in the Netherlands.

Thorston Holz

Prof. Dr. Thorsten Holz is a tenured faculty at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security in Saarbrücken, where he moved in October 2021. Before this position, Thorsten was a full professor in the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology at Ruhr University Bochum. His research interests include technical aspects of secure systems, with a specific focus on systems security.

Currently, his work concentrates on reverse engineering, automated vulnerability detection, and studying latest attack vectors. He received the Dipl.-Inform. degree in Computer Science from RWTH Aachen, Germany (2005) and the Ph.D. degree from University of Mannheim (2009). In 2011, he received the Heinz Maier-Leibnitz Prize from the German Research Foundation (DFG), in 2014 an ERC Starting Grant, and in 2022 an ERC Consolidator Grant.

Christian D. Jensen

Dr. Jensen holds a Ph.D. in computer science from Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble, France), an M.Sc. in computer science from the University of Copenhagen (Denmark), an eMBA from the Technical University of Denmark and an M.A. (jure officii) from Trinity College Dublin (Ireland).
He is an associate professor at the Department of Applied Mathematics & Computer Science at the Technical University of Denmark, where he teaches and conducts research in the area of security in open distributed systems. He is the course director for the past time program Master in Cybersecurity.

For the past 20 years, he has focused on context-aware security solutions, including trust-based methods and technologies to secure collaboration among entities in open distributed system. His work on Trust Management addresses all 3 As in AAA: Authentication, where he has pioneered work in virtual anonymity and entity recognition; Access control policies and mechanisms that build on the human notion of trust; and Accountability through reputation and recommendation systems.

Kaitai Liang

Dr. Liang is a tenured faculty member at TU Delft, possessing over 11 years of experience in cybersecurity research and development. His primary focus is on designing and implementing cryptographic protocols for secure systems and intelligence. He has led several European-funded projects as the primary investigator, including TANGO, ASSURED, IRIS, and Academic of Finland. Through these projects, Dr. Liang has achieved real-world impact alongside his academic and industrial partners. His research work applying information security and cryptographic tools to address real-world issues has been published in international information security conferences and journals, including USENIX Security, NDSS, ESORICS (Best Research Paper Award 2015), IEEE TIFS, and IEEE TDSC. Dr. Liang has served as technical program committee and chair for over 25 internationally recognized security/privacy conferences, such as IEEE Euro S&P, IEEE CSF, ESORICS. He has contributed to ISO standards as an NEN standards committee “Cybersecurity & Privacy” and is an associate editor for the Computer Journal, IEEE Systems Journal, and IEEE Transactions on AI. He is the coordinator of MSc cybersecurity specialisation programme and board member of APNet.

Mark Manulis

Prof. Dr.  Mark Manulis is full professor in the Department of Computer Science at the Universität der Bundeswehr München.

Since 2022 he is a member of the Research Institute CODE where he heads the PACY lab for Privacy and Applied Cryptography. His research is on privacy-enhancing technologies underpinned by modern cryptographic methods and techniques. His research foci include protocols for secure processing of encrypted and distributed data, functional/attribute-based encryption and signature schemes, privacy-preserving authentication and key management protocols, protocols for private messaging, and privacy-enhancing cryptography for decentralised multi-party applications.

His publication track record includes some 100 peer-reviewed publications in leading international security venues. He received Best Paper awards from ISC 2016 and InTrust 2014. He was program chair of ISC 2018 and ACNS 2016, general chair of CANS 2012 and PKC 2012, workshop chair at ESORICS 2020, and organiser of the Dagstuhl-Seminar on Privacy-Oriented Cryptography in 2012. He is associate editor for IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security and Springer’s International Journal of Information Security, and is an active member of IACR and IEEE.

Panagiotis Papadimitratos

Panos Papadimitratos earned his Ph.D. degree from Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. At KTH, Stockholm, Sweden, he leads the Networked Systems Security group and he is a member of the steering committee of the Security Link center. He serves or served as: member (and currently chair) of the ACM WiSec conference steering committee; member of the PETS Editorial and Advisory Boards and the CANS conference steering committee; program chair for the ACM WiSec 2016, TRUST 2016 and CANS’18 conferences; general chair for ACM WISec 2018, PETS 2019 and IEEE EuroS&P 2019 conferences; and Associate Editor of the IEEE TMC, ACM/IEEE ToN, IET IFS and ACM MC2R journals.

Panos is a Fellow of the Young Academy of Europe, a Knut and Alice Wallenberg Academy Fellow, an IEEE Fellow, and an ACM Distinguished Member. His group webpage is: www.eecs.kth.se/nss.

Gene Tsudik

Gene Tsudik is a Distinguished Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Irvine (UCI).

He obtained his PhD in Computer Science from USC in 1991. Before coming to UCI in 2000, he was at the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory (1991-1996) and USC/ISI (1996-2000). His research interests include numerous topics in security, privacy and applied cryptography.

Gene Tsudik is a Fulbright Scholar, Fulbright Specialist (thrice), a fellow of ACM, IEEE, AAAS, IFIP and a foreign member of Academia Europaea. From 2009 to 2015 he served as Editor-in-Chief of ACM TOPS: Transactions on Privacy and Security. He was the recipient of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Contribution Award, and the 2020 IFIP Jean-Claude Laprie Award.

His magnum opus is the first ever rhyming crypto-poem published as a refereed paper. Gene Tsudik is hostile to machine learning, blockchains and differential privacy. He also has no social media presence.