



# THE MODERN FIGHT FOR **FREEDOM**

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TAKING BACK  
CONTROL OF YOUR DIGITAL IDENTITY

ASSURED WEBINAR 11/07/2023

WHAT IS  
**DIGITAL**  
IDENTITY



## DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITY



### SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY

I hold **my** claims.  
I am in **control**



### CENTRALIZED IDENTITY

IANA, ICANN, Phone  
Company, CA's



### USER-CENTRIC IDENTITY

Consent & Interoperability

FIDO, OPENID




### FEDERATED IDENTITY

Same Identity - multiple  
places.

## TRIANGLE OF TRUST

**Verifiable Credential (VC)**  
Contains claims and attributes


**Verifiable Presentation (VP)**  
Contains a subset of claims,  
including proofs, from the VC



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## THE CHALLENGES OF SELF-SOVEREIGNTY



### USER RESPONSIBILITY

Trust and responsibility moved from centralized, **high-value, high-security** organizations to **low-value, low-security** users.

1. How can we guarantee that the credential was not moved?
2. How do we make sure the wallet-platform isn't compromised?
3. ...And how do we do this, while giving the user control over their own privacy?



### MALICIOUSNESS

might share credentials and act in malice.


Triangle of Trust

## THE TPM



### TPM Fundamentals

- Cryptographic Processor
- Small Internal Storage
- Policy Engine: Conditional Cryptography
- Keys are encrypted - can *only* be read by this particular TPM



### Keys

Can be linked to *policies*, that can make the key usable under certain conditions, or limit the abilities of the key. Can *not* be moved to another platform\*.

### PCRs

Contains a digital fingerprint of the residing platform. Firmware, bootloader, etc. Can even hold fingerprints of applications.

\*Keys can, if needed, be created to be copyable, but it's not common.

# The ASSURED approach

By adding a **unique TPM key** to every issued **credential**, the issuer can get guarantees that the credential is safe. How?

By signing all **presentations** with this key. But it requires some properties.

## KEY PROPERTIES

- May only be used in a Trusted State (PCRs)
- May only be used by authorization of the wallet
- Can only be used on particular TPM (hence: platform)
- Can provide *unlinkable* signatures (DAA)
- Policy (Trusted State) can be updated by the issuer, and only the Issuer.

All **presentations** must be signed by this key. If verified, the verifier knows

- The presentation comes from a trusted platform according to the issuer - if the verifier trusts the issuer, it now trusts that the presentation isn't a product of malicious software
- The presentation is made through an authorized wallet
- The credential has not been moved ... Or has it?

## DAA KEY

It's not possible for the verifier to determine *which* key gave the signature, only that it was valid and issued by that Issuer. What if a *similar* holder provided a signature, but he had a different security level?

## SOLUTION

- Make the key part of the credential
  - ◀ Only a platform that can load that particular key, can get the claims.
  - ◀ This is possible through DAA-A



## Conclusion

### IT IS DIFFICULT

It is very difficult to protect privacy while at the same time guarantee security.


### IT IS WORTH IT

Ensuring **we** hold our identities reduces the amount of data out there, enhances the privacy of the holder.

### THERE IS A LOT TO BE DONE

We're not finished, there is a lot to be done, and a lot of parties that need to work together. But it can be done, and it must be done.

**This is the modern fight for freedom, and it's worth the  
fight.**



The background of the slide is a complex, abstract network of glowing blue lines and dots, resembling a molecular structure or a data network, set against a dark blue gradient. This pattern occupies the left half of the slide, separated from the right half by a diagonal white line.

# **THANKS**

Does anyone have any questions?