

# **Efficient and Scalable Fuzzing of Complex Software Stacks** Prof. Thorsten Holz





#### Recent Research







## Fuzzing Overview



















## Fuzzing Overview




#### Miller: <u>http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~bart/fuzz/</u> (1988)





## Coverage-Guided Fuzzing
















## Coverage-Guided Fuzzing
















# NYX/NYX-Net



## Fuzzing Overview










## Efficient State-Machine Exploration







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




















Schumilo et al.:"'Nyx-Net: Network Fuzzing with Incremental Snapshots", EuroSys'22











Efficient and Scalable Fuzzing of Complex Software Stacks



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Slide # 9









Efficient and Scalable Fuzzing of Complex Software Stacks



EuroSys'22 **Snapshots**<sup>7</sup> Fuzzing with Incremental al.:"Nyx-Net: Network Schum

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


EuroSys'22 Snapshots with al.:"Nyx-Net: N Schum



## Fuzzing Firefox with Nyx-Net












# Drone Security




#### DJI Drones




#### **DJI Universal Markup Language** (DUML)














### Security Assessment












## Fuzzing Drones







## Fuzztruction



#### Motivation

- Pairs of programs encode domain knowledge about given protocol
  - encrypted message)
  - decrypt encrypted message)



#### Generator generates content (e.g., generate PDF file or

# Consumer processes content (e.g., display PDF file or



#### Motivation

- Pairs of programs encode domain knowledge about given protocol
  - Generator generates content (e.g., generate PDF file or encrypted message)
  - Consumer processes content (e.g., display PDF file or decrypt encrypted message)
- How can we efficiently test such programs without domain knowledge?
- Basic insight: we can use generator for input generation





## Intuition

- Randomly flipping instruction bits in generator would not affect output and—even worse—lead to crashes
- Compile-time analysis to identify operations on data and filter out crashing operations
  - Analyze data-flow dependencies to avoid redundant mutations
- Instrument generator and just-in-time (JIT)-compile both tracing and mutation mechanisms


















#### Results

- Loosely Structured Formats (objdump, readelf)
- Cryptographic Formats (OpenSSL's dsa and rsa, and Mozilla NSS' vfychain)



# Complex Formats (pngtopng, unzip, 7zip, and pdftotext)



#### Results


**Roadbloc** Target Checksums Con rsa Cry Moz dsa vfychain 7zip<sup>(</sup> pdftotext<sup>(</sup> unzip<sup>(</sup> pngtopng e2fsck readelf objdump



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
## Results







# Summary & Outlook



#### Trophy Cases







#### Towards Secure Systems

- Efficiently fuzz deeper parts of the compute stack
  - UEFI? SMM / SMI handler? MSRs? ISA? Pre-silicon?





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- Machine learning to the rescue?
  - Can we reuse knowledge from previous fuzzing campaigns?
  - Can we use LLMs to generate interesting inputs?





### Towards Secure Systems

- Efficiently fuzz deeper parts of the compute stack
  - UEFI? SMM / SMI handler? MSRs? ISA? Pre-silicon?
- Machine learning to the rescue?
  - Can we reuse knowledge from previous fuzzing campaigns?
  - Can we use LLMs to generate interesting inputs?
- How to handle all the bugs founds?
  - Automated root cause analysis
  - Automated patching of found vulnerabilities





#### References

- Bars et al.: "Fuzztruction: Using Fault Injection-based Fuzzing to Leverage Implicit Domain Knowledge", USENIX Security'23 Schiller et al.: "Drone Security and the Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID",
- NDSS'23
- Schumilo et al.: "Nyx: Greybox Hypervisor Fuzzing using Fast Snapshots and Affine Types", USENIX Security'21
- Schumilo et al.: "Nyx-Net: Network Fuzzing with Incremental Snapshots", EuroSys'22
- Aschermann et al.: "IJON: Exploring Deep State Spaces via Fuzzing", IEEE S&P'20
- Aschermann et al.: "Nautilus: Fishing for Deep Bugs with Grammars", NDSS'19 Blazytko et al.: "Grimoire: Synthesizing Structure while Fuzzing", USENIX
- Security'19
- Aschermann et al.: "Redqueen: Fuzzing with Input-to-State Correspondence", NDSS'19









#### Abstract

In this talk, I will give an overview of our recent progress in randomized testing ("fuzzing") and present some of the methods we have developed in the last few years. These include fuzzing of operating system kernels and hypervisors, grammar-based fuzzing of complex interpreters, and fuzz testing of embedded systems. The talk will focus on our recent work on Fuzztruction, a novel perspective on generating inputs in highly complex formats without relying on heavyweight program analysis techniques, coarse-grained grammar approximation, or a human domain expert. I will conclude the talk with an outlook on challenges yet to be solved.



